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I. Introduction
In June of 2012, President Barack Obama enacted an executive, non-enforcement policy
under the title of DACA which stands for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals. This
scheme came after weeks of Congressional silence and inaction in response to President
Obama’s push for immigration reform. The overall goal of DACA was to help the department of
homeland security narrowly tailor their focus and only deport dangerous felons, all the while
making sure to remain lenient and merciful to young students or military officials who also faced
the possibility of deportation because their parents had brought them into this country illegally
years ago. These students and military members had to be under the age of thirty and were also
required to have lived in the United States for the past five years in order to qualify for deferred
action.
DACA, in this context, was of the utmost necessity for these individuals for without the
program, they would all be deported to their parent’s homeland, a land of which was not their
own. It would be foreign to them, and most of the students might not have been able to speak the
countries native tongue nor would they have been able to enter the United States, ever again.
Even though deferred action constitutes as prosecutorial discretion, the executive branch
did use this discretion in the right manner and context in order to save and preserve the lives of
those who might not be able to save themselves. And since their deportation would be deferred
for an upwards of three years and they would also be granted work authorization, this allowed
the children, teenagers and young adults to stay within the country in order to obtain full, legal
citizenship status.
However, with the institution of DACA, supporters and dissenters both questioned the
constitutionality behind this non-enforcement policy. It also caused me to originally question
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whether or not the President of the United States could use a discretionary power that is
seemingly not his own? These issues prompted me to delve deeper into what exactly
prosecutorial discretion was, first and foremost. But in order to do so, I had to familiarize myself
with the history and origins of the American prosecutor. Although the prosecutor may be a
uniquely American contribution, it has its roots deeply embedded in the history of the English
tradition. From private to public prosecutions and everything in between, both Europe and the
American colonies experienced similar trials, triumphs and tribulations, alike, as they attempted
to remedy the ills and harm caused by crime over the past few hundred and even thousands of
years.
The most analogous figure in the early English system that resembles the American
prosecutor is the English Attorney General. The English Attorney General was originally an aid
to the King and dealt with matters solely relating to the crown. As time passed, the functions of
the Attorney General metamorphosed, as well. In the American colonies during the latter half of
the nineteenth century, the Attorney General was a General by name only. His abilities were
severely limited even though the Department of Justice specifically stated they were to be in
charge of overseeing all assistant attorneys and prosecutors that fell below him. However, this
oversight never occurred. The Attorney General refrained himself from interfering in the daily
operations of the nascent American prosecutor for he felt that local governments would be more
apt to serve as a check upon their power. This lack of oversight allowed the prosecutor to absorb
an almost unabridged and unprecedented amount of power.
Moreover, the power of the prosecutor started with another historical phenomenon: the
nolle prosequi. The nolle is a legal instrument to halt the prosecution of a proceeding case. It was
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originally used by the English Attorney General and then it was inherited by the entire line of
American prosecutors. And its influence did not end there.
According to John Marshall, as seen in historical Congressional records,1 The President
of the United States at the time, John Adams, issued a nolle prosequi to stop the prosecution of
Jonathan Robbins.2 The President was under fire due to his use of the prosecutorial instrument,
but John Marshall came to John Adams’ aid and stated that it was a said duty of the President to
issue a nolle. Not only this, but the nolle was directly in the executive’s line of power and is
indubitably a constitutional power, as well. This is because one of the President’s responsibilities
is to express the “will of the nation” 3 and if the nation’s will is to be in accordance with a greater
societal interest or substantive end that calls for the use of the nolle, then the act will forever be
accordance with the founding principles of the American Republic. Moreover, President Adams
use of the nolle was in no way interfering with the other channels of government nor does it
interfere with traditional judicial proceedings.
Upon the rendering of Marshall’s judgment, there was suddenly an influx in the usage of
the nolle prosequi by prosecutors and the executives that followed Adams. Not only was the
popularity of the nolle increasing but the nolle, itself, also became entrenched into the records
and opinions of case law. This is because the courts ruled in favor of the nolle time and time
again and went as far as to presume its constitutionality. Additionally, judges felt that they were
both incapable of reviewing the reasoning behind issuing a nolle pros, in the first place.
Both the power of the nolle and the power of the American prosecutor continued to slip
away from the publics grasp and accountability slipped away with it. The lack of accountability

1

10 Annals of Congress. 618; Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and
Developments, 18.
2
Krauss, 17 (See footnote on Ruth, 100, 288-89); United States v. Rob[b]ins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 827-31.
3
10 Annals of Congress. 618; Krauss, 18.
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allowed even more room for the power of the prosecutor to grow. The courts became so
complacent with the nolle that they stopped using the term and then shortly after, the term
“prosecutorial discretion” began to appear in both everyday language as well as more court
records.
But prosecutorial discretion is much different than the original nolle. As early as the
twentieth century the prosecutor now had complete reign over all criminal proceedings including
if and when to charge an individual, what charges to bring against them, whether or not to issue a
plea bargain or deal and everything else in between. The American prosecutor was now the most
dominant figure in the entire criminal justice system and they still are to this day.
However, prosecutorial accountability issues and even their immunity from misconduct
are all threats to the American democratic order. Nonetheless, even though these are legitimate
fears, prosecutors and their discretion are both a necessary evil. 4 For without this figure and their
immense power, there would be overly strict adherence to the law. In turn, this would undermine
justice, criminal punishment would be all the more disproportionate, and most importantly,
mercy and greater societal interests would simply be forgotten. 5 And, the executive department
would not be able to function properly since the American prosecutor directly falls within the
scope of the branch, as well. Therefore, the merits of prosecutorial discretion outweigh the risks.
After discovering the necessity of prosecutorial discretion, I began to question whether or
not the same could be said about executive discretion. In order to gain a better understanding of
this discretion, I turned to history, once again, as well as political philosopher John Locke and
his concept of prerogative from his Second Treatise. Locke defines prerogative as “the power to

4

Angela Davis, Arbitrary Justice, 6-8.
Peter L. Markowitz, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION POWER AT ITS ZENITH: THE
POWER TO PROTECT LIBERTY,” 496.
5
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act according to discretion for the publick good, without the prescription of the Law, and
sometimes even against it.” 6 And, prerogative shall only be used “for the benefit of the
Community.”7
Prerogative is wholly necessary because laws, themselves, do not always provide for the
public good or good of society. And, since it is impossible to foresee all “accidents and
necessities,” the executive is left with an impressive “latitude […] to do many things of choice,
which the Laws do not prescribe.” 8 But one must remember when exercising prerogative is that
its sole, and sole purpose only, is for the preservation of the people. 9
John Locke’s philosophies also had a strong influence upon the American founding and
the Founding Fathers. Even Hamilton once said, “extraordinary exigencies demand extraordinary
means.”10 The extraordinary means he is referring to is none other than prerogative and
prerogative needs to be without limitation, as well. And, as long as the extraordinary act or
measure does not violate the rights of individuals, state rights, and is considered moral, there is
strong evidence to suggest its constitutional viability.11 However, is prerogative meant to be
intertwined with the workings of the American Republic? After all, it is never explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution. But, despite the ambiguities and questions surrounding
prerogative powers, Peter L. Markowitz has been able to locate prosecutorial discretion or
discretionary powers in general, in the framework of the Constitution with certainty.12 The three
main sources of power are Article II’s Take Care Clause, the Executive Vesting Clause, and the

6

Locke, §160.
Locke, §163.
8
Locke, §160.
9
Locke, §159-160.
10
Fatovic, 437; Hamilton, Alexander Hamilton’s Writings, 58.
11
Fatovic, 437; Hamilton, Alexander Hamilton’s Writings (“Opinions on the Constitutionality of the National
Bank”), 613, 621.
12
Markowitz, 516.
7
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Pardon Clause.13 His findings are in accord with Locke’s treatise for Locke identifies two
specific prerogative powers, the pardon power, thus mentioned by Markowitz and the
presidential power to convoke or dissolve the legislature. Although these are not parallel
findings, Locke believed it was more beneficial for prerogative powers to be left almost entirely
unenumerated. This was to ensure that executive acts of prerogative had an optimal amount of
flexibility and the least amount of legal or constitutional restraints as possible, especially in times
of great need. This is a stark contrast to the Royal Prerogative powers, as seen in Great Britain,
which are numerous and quite explicit.
However, in America, the Founding Fathers, especially Hamilton and Jefferson, agreed
that prerogative is an extraconstitutional power. This means that not only is prerogative attached
to the Constitution, but it is within its prose just as Markowitz suggests. By no means is
prerogative extra-legal for as both Hamilton and Jefferson claim, prerogative is irreducible to law
and also immune from judicial review. 14 After all, acts of prerogative are meant to be temporary
or transient. Its effects are not meant to be long-lasting. The Founders knew the importance of
keeping prerogative out of the judiciary because if explicit boundaries were not rendered,
prerogative would become entrenched in precedent just as prosecutorial discretion has become
entrenched into American case law. Otherwise, this would make it harder for future presidents to
act in a discretionary manner and further restrict the secrecy and speed of the executive
department, as a whole. And the president needs sufficient power and flexibility in order to
preserve the liberty of the nation and its people.
Furthermore, prerogative is not in opposition to the American Republic and Hamilton
often prefers it in times of need as opposed to the typical rigid, time-consuming mechanisms of

13
14

Markowitz, 517; U.S. Constitution, Article II, §1, 2, 3.
See section III.

9
democracy. Without prerogative, the executive would be severely limited, and the other branches
of government would constantly have to expand his power by force or by law. That, Hamilton
claims is far more dangerous than simply letting the president use his discretion on a case-bycase basis. But of course, discretion cannot be used whenever the president so wishes.
Markowitz believes there should be a limiting principle placed upon discretion, especially
prosecutorial discretion for that matter. He states that prosecutorial discretion should only be
used in times where physical liberty is at stake, for as we can recall, the merits of prosecutorial
discretion help secure justice, social interests and mercy. Justice Scalia also reveres the necessity
of prosecutorial discretion because it can balance innumerable and practical considerations that
also may arise and can protect innocent people from experiencing depravations of freedom, as
well.
These facts and findings, along with Locke’s insights on prerogative, display the
importance and necessity of discretionary powers from the start. And, these findings as we will
discover, have led me to argue and advocate for DACA’s overall constitutionality. This is
because it has preserved the safety and the welfare of those who were innocent and could not
otherwise have defended themselves. Without DACA, the United States would not be the same
country as it is today, because the people are what truly constitutes this great nation. President
Obama, in this regard, was truly a beacon of salvation for all the DREAMERs in 2012.

a. The Three Actors: The American Prosecutor, John Locke’s Concept of Prerogative, & the
Executive
Due to the complexities and intricacies of this thesis, it is beneficial to regard each figure
or concept independently and then reflect upon them, cohesively, in the final sections. It is only
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logical to start by examining the prosecutor and prosecutorial discretion before decoding DACA.
However, before attempting that, I also have to explain the origins and significance of
prerogative not only in a historical context but also what it means for the American Republic and
how it is accurately applied. Only then will I be able to fully examine the executive and his use
of prerogative and discretionary powers.
And one final note, I do often use the terms “prerogative” and “prosecutorial discretion,”
interchangeably. However, prosecutorial discretion is only one sector or portion of prerogative
power, on the whole.

II. The American Prosecutor
The American prosecutor is often referred to as a minister of justice, an advocate, and an
officer of the court. 15 Prosecutors are responsible for charging the criminally accused, pleabargaining, and even assisting law enforcement during criminal investigations. However, the
main focus of this section will be the very phenomenon, of which, prosecutors use to make their
everyday decisions. This “decision-making” phenomenon is none other than prosecutorial
discretion. Prosecutorial discretion has indubitably transformed the prosecutor into “the most
powerful official[s] in the American criminal justice system,”16 today. However, before pursuing
a more conclusive investigation into this type of discretion, it is necessary to recount the complex
historical origins of the American prosecutor first and foremost. This will help further explain
the rapid growth of their power as well as further elucidate their role as a public figure.

15
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Pryde, The Prosecutor’s Handbook, 7.
Angela Davis, Arbitrary Justice, 5.
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a. The History of the American Prosecutor
Although the prosecutor is believed to be “a product of the American experience,” as
well as a “distinct and uniquely American contribution,” 17 the prosecutor still has prominent
historical origins that are deeply rooted in the European tradition.
During the middle ages, England’s, as well as the entire European continent’s, 18 modus
operandi for dealing with crime was the “crime victim” 19 method or the “Frank-pledge
system.”20 This is where the victim’s family acted as the police, prosecutor and the judge in order
to bring the guilty to justice. Or in other words, track down the offender, inflict punishment upon
them and then seek restitution. 21 This is because there were no organized police forces 22 and the
only formal prosecutor, at the time, was said to be an aide to the king.23 Although kings,
generally, were only concerned with matters related to the crown, they still placed restrictions
upon private vengeance24 in order to alleviate as much disruption as possible. And of course, to
collect revenue.25
As time went on, the Anglo-Saxon legal system transformed. There were now nascent
judicial settlements for private disputes. Although private vengeance was removed from the
equation, the responsibility of accusing an individual of a crime still fell upon the family.
Surprisingly, even after the Norman Conquest of 1066, the Normans preserved many of the

17

Kress,100.
Yue Ma, Exploring the Origins of Public Prosecution, 196.
19
Davis, 10.
20 Ma, 192.
21
Davis, 9.
22 Ma, 192.
23
“The French king employed the procurer du roi (the king’s prosecutor) to protect his own interests.” He later
transformed into the public prosecutor or ministère publique in the 16th century; Ma, 197-198.
24
A. Esmein A history of continental criminal procedure; C.L.V. Bar, A history of continental criminal law; Ma,
191; W. Forsyth, History of trial by jury.
25
Ma, 192.
18
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Anglo-Saxon institutions for determining guilt. 26 These included the judicial settlement method,
as well as “trial by oath-taking or ordeal,” to name a few. 27 The trials were often combative,
according to Yue Ma, as well as:
[…] accusatory and adversarial in nature. The aggrieved party and the alleged
offender, no longer permitted to battle one another in private vengeance, fought
with oaths, sticks, or swords under the formal guidance of the court. Because of the
private nature of crime, it was the duty of the injured party or his kin to take the
initiative to set the proceeding in motion. Bringing a criminal accusation was a risky
venture. The accuser could either fall in a judicial combat or be forced to undergo
the punishment he had hoped to inflict on the accused if he failed to prove his case
(Ma, Exploring the Origins of Public Prosecutions, 192).
Moreover, the oath-taking method involved twelve “oath-helpers.” These oath-helpers did
not attest to the evidence that surrounded the criminal matter but rather, they did attest to
an individual’s reputation or innocence.28
As time continued to progress, criminal and legal developments also progressed during
the 12th and 13th centuries.29 For instance, the Norman kings became heavily concerned with law
and order within the state, the jury of presentment was now underway, and archaic methods of
proof were disregarded and replaced by rational means. 30 This was all due in part to the Magna
Carta of 1215. It specifically stated that “that no one should be prosecuted except by the
judgment of his peers.”31
During the 13th century and onward, England finally developed the act of private
prosecutions.32 However, the remainder of the European continent had already made the radical
switch to public prosecutions by then.33 All the while England held onto private prosecutions,

26

Ma, 192.
Ma. 192.
28
Esmein; Ma, 192; R.C. Van Caenegem, Legal history: A European perspective.
29
Ma, 193.
30
Ma, 193.
31
Claire Breay & Julian Harrison, “Magna Carta an Introduction.”
32
Ma, 193.
33
G. O. W. Mueller & F. L. Poole-Griffiths, Comparative criminal procedure; Ma, 196.
27
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France’s system advocated for them to go public. This shift in prosecutions stemmed from the
French Code of Criminal Procedure of 1808 during the Napoleonic era. It was so influential that
“Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, the western region of Germany, and part of
Poland”34 adopted it and refined it to their liking.
Even though the transfer from private to public prosecutions was long and drawn out in
England, the transition did occur with the help of the constable, justices of the peace, the police,
the attorney general and with the institution of the director of prosecutions. 35 The constable was
the arresting officer, but he was very limited when it came to criminal investigations.36 Justices
of the peace were directly appointed by the king and gained their powers through the Marian
Committal Statute of 1555. 37 This statute defined their functions as keepers of peace within the
community and they had the duty to question individuals that were considered to be involved in
serious, local crimes.38 They also presented the accused before a grand jury. However, the
constable and justices of the peace were soon outdated during the wake of the industrial
revolution.39 This is when private police agents, or “thief-takers,” began to capture wanted
felons. These agents would also receive monetary rewards for their services. But, reward systems
often produced false witnesses as well as false convictions. This is when defense counsels began
to make their presence known during criminal trials in order to remedy these injustices.40
Families also enjoyed the option of hiring private barristers, after the establishment of the
London Metropolitan Police force in 1829. 41 Although the family unit was still responsible for

34

Ma, 198
Ma, 193.
36
Ma, 193.
37
Ma, 194.
38
Ma, 193.
39
Ma, 194.
40
Ma, 194.
41
Davis, 9.
35
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initiating the criminal investigation by accusing an individual, they became more reluctant to do
so, due to the growing complexities of the legal system.42 It was also extremely expensive to hire
private barristers and the cost was a disadvantage to those who belonged to a lower socioeconomic class.43 Sir Robert Peel, especially during his years as a prime minister from 18341835 and 1841-1846, was cognizant of this seemingly insurmountable obstacle. As a result, he
began to advocate for system reform. 44 This social advocacy was strengthened by the prior
advocacy of Jeremy Bentham in the years prior Sir Robert Peel’s time in office. Unfortunately,
in the end, both of the men’s efforts fell upon deaf ears.45
Nonetheless, public opinion still shifted despite the lack of improvement of the criminal
justice system. Accusing someone of a crime now became a public responsibility as opposed to
the victim’s family members.46 This originated from the centuries-old tradition that it was a
citizen’s duty to uphold the law and preserve the king’s peace. 47 This notion finally dissolved the
traditional role of the “justice of the peace,” mentioned earlier. The private citizen and police
were now responsible for “the maintenance of law and order.”48
All the while the private prosecution system was evolving, the system of official
prosecutions evolved, as well. The official prosecutor was and is still known as the attorney
general.49 His early duties included appearances in civil court, the ability to commence or
terminate a prosecution and also review cases to see if they involved a royal interest. 50 This is

42

Ma, 194.
Davis, 9; Ma, 194.
44
Davis, 9.
45 Davis 9-10. Reform came in 1879 when Parliament passed the “Prosecutions of Offenses Act.” This act was
responsible for not only the emergence of police departments but also for dissolving all family ties to criminal
proceedings from then onward.
46
Ma, 194.
47
Ma, 194.
48
Ma, 195.
49
Ma, 195.
50
Ma, 195.
43
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because the Attorney General, is and always has been, the king’s attorney throughout history. In
regard to the commencement and termination of prosecutions, that will be addressed and
examined in the following subsection.
The Attorney General, before 1879, was considered to be the only public prosecutor in
England. During that year, the position of the post director of prosecutions was formed and
absorbed some of the functions and duties of the Attorney General. However, he was quite
limited and could only intervene in a select number of prosecutable cases. These obstacles kept
undermining both the operation and the significance of public prosecutions. Private prosecutions
were still viewed more favorably. Nevertheless, great miscarriages of justice continued to persist
in both systems.51 Angela Davis also stated that both systems were considered to be chaotic and
inefficient.52
General dissatisfaction continued to fester in response to the growing problems that
plagued the English criminal justice system well into the late 20 th century. Reform finally came
with the enactment of the Crown’s Prosecution Service in 1985. 53 This service was the first,
official, public prosecution agency in all of England and inspired the rest of the British criminal
justice system to follow suit.54 Public prosecutions became the new wave of the future. But this
wave had already crashed upon the shores of the American colonies many centuries ago, just as
it had crashed upon the surrounding European countries, as well.
As history has come to show, the American colonies were undoubtedly influenced by the
English court system, not to mention the very premise of the American legal system rests upon

51

Ma, 195.
Davis, page 10.
53
Ma, 196.
54
Bennion; Fionda; Ma, 196.
52
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the English common law. 55 This is why during early colonial times “the [English] grand and petit
juries, the sheriff, the justices of the peace and the tradition of private prosecutions” 56 all made
their formal appearance in the colonies. However, it is interesting to note that the American
colonists did not view private prosecutions favorably. They were said to be “incompatible with
their ideals of justice” and equality. 57 Therefore, to account for the growing interests, Virginia
instituted the very first attorney general and public prosecutor in 1643.58 The American Attorney
General is analogous to the English Attorney General.59 This is because the American Attorney
General’s primary interest still resided in the king. He also provided “advisory opinion to the
courts.”60 It was not until the latter half of the century when his role transitioned into the realm of
public prosecution and his aide to the king formally dissolved.61
At first, the attorney general was able to handle all criminal matters. But then, the
colonies grew, and deputy attorneys began to make their appearance:
The deep fear of centralized governmental power among colonists played a
significant role in the shaping of the early prosecutorial apparatus. The desire to
keep local autonomy laid the ground for the development of strong American
tradition of local government, including the decentralized judiciary and the local
prosecutorial structure. Deputy attorneys general originally were appointed by the
attorney general. But the local courts soon assumed the responsibility of selecting
deputy attorneys general. The deputy attorneys general became local rather than
colonywide officials. As the attorney general lost control of deputy attorneys
general, prosecution of crime also became largely a local affair (Chittwood; Ma,
199-200).
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Ma, 191.
A. H. Flaherty, An introduction to early American legal history; L. M. Friedman, A history of American law; Ma,
199; W. Pencak & W.W. Holt, Jr., The law in America: 1607-1861.
57
F.R. Aumann, The changing American legal system: Some selected phases;; B. Chapin, Criminal justice in
colonial America; Ma, 199; Pencak & Holt.
58
Davis, page 10. They were also appointees of the court.
59
Ma, page 191.
60
Ma, 199.
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Ma, 199.
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A similar “pattern of development” followed in the other colonies. Maryland and New
Hampshire appointed their first attorney general in the years 1666 and 1683,62 respectively.
In the other colonies such as New York, New Jersey and Delaware, their mode of
prosecution fell under Dutch influence—especially the Dutch schout.63 The schout was both “a
constable and a court officer” who “ha[s] the power to make an arrest and present the alleged
offender before the court,” and “shall,” under the Dutch ordinance of 1660, “ex officio, prosecute
all contraveners, defrauders and transgressors of any Edicts, Laws, Statutes and Ordinances
which are already made and published, or shall hereafter be enacted and made public.”64
Although, it was not long before the schout transformed into the sheriff.65 The sheriff of the
Dutch colonies still retained the same original duties and responsibilities.
Like most of continental Europe, Louisiana was influenced by the French system’s mode
of prosecution. They also had a “Superior Council” that embodied Louis XIV’s authority. This
council was both a legislature and a court of last resort for both criminal and civil matters.66 It
also operated under traditional French statues and procedures, even the Civil Code of
Napoleon.67 But after the Louisiana purchase, the civil law tradition finally “exerted its
influence” over the territory. 68 For example, the judge, the structural nuances of a trial, and of
course, the art of public prosecution69 became the new norm.

62

Ma, 200.
Ma, 200.
64
W.S. Van Alstyne, The district attorney: A historical puzzle, 130.
65
Ma, 200.
66
Ma, 200.
67
J. E. Goulka, The first constitutional right to criminal appeal: Louisiana’s Constitution of 1845 and the clash of
the common law and natural law traditions; A.A. Levasseur, The major periods of Louisiana legal history; Ma, 200201.
68
M.A. Coffey & J. B. Norman, Selected problems of the Louisiana grand jury; Goulka, 2002; K. A. Lambert, The
suffocation of a legal heritage: A comparative analysis of civil procedure in Louisiana and France; The corruption of
Louisiana’s civilian tradition; Ma, 201.
69
Goulka, 2002; Lambert, 1992; Ma, 201.
63
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Public prosecutions were further facilitated after the American Revolution and the
establishment of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 70 This act not only instituted the federal court system
and official system of prosecution, it also separated law enforcement officers and prosecutors
into two separate and distinct roles. 71 Furthermore, the deputy attorney generals soon became
district attorneys in various colonies, such as New York and New Jersey. 72 Massachusetts
followed suit and created its own office for the county attorney in 1807. 73 They were also
required to take an oath of office before the appointment process was complete:
[A] person learned in the law is to act as attorney for the United States in such
district, who shall be sworn or affirmed to the faithful execution of his office, whose
duty it shall be to prosecute in such district all delinquents for crimes and offences,
cognizable under the authority of the United States, and all civil actions in which
the United States shall be concerned (“Establishment of the Judicial Courts of the
United States,” 1789; Ma, 201).
All district or county attorneys were intended to fall under the “supervision” of the United States
Attorney General. There are quotations marks surrounding the term “supervision” because even
though the attorneys enjoyed a great sense of independence, they were actually “subject to
almost no centralized control.” 74 This lack of supervision changed during and after the Civil War
when the Attorney General was required to superintend all those who fell below him. The power
and the duties of the attorney general were further strengthened by the establishment of the
Department of Justice in 1870. 75 Even though power had become centralized, the Attorney
General refrained from interfering with the daily operations of the U.S. attorneys due to the

“Establishment of the Judicial Courts of the United States,” 1789; Ma, 201.
Ma, 200-201.
72
Ma, 201.
73
G. Fisher, Plea bargaining’s triumph; J. E. Jacoby, The American prosecutor: A search for identity; W.S. Van
Alstyne, The district attorney: A historical puzzle; Ma, 201.
74
Ma, 201-202.
75
Friedman, 1985; Jacoby, 1980; Ma, 202.
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19
American tradition of accountability at the local level. 76 As a result, the prosecutors enjoyed
“considerable autonomy in [their] decision making.” 77
However, this was not the case for certain prosecutors who were appointed by either the
governor, the state Attorney Generals78 or even judges. These individuals “had to consider the
wishes of the actors who had appointed them” 79 and in turn, this diminished their legitimacy as
important figures in the criminal justice system. 80
This issue soon began to fade as the Jacksonian era began.81 Instead of official
appointments, prosecutors now appeared on ballot slips and thus gained the right to their
electoral status. 82 Their newly obtained electoral status was revolutionary and a truly “distinctive
feature in the American prosecutorial system.” 83 But as time went on, especially in the 20th
century, prosecutors began to disappear from the ballot.84 Today, only four states still officially
elect prosecutors. 85 Not only did this result in full control of all criminal prosecutions,86 but it
also suggests that prosecutors are now able to escape all forms of accountability. Davis argues
that this could lead to arbitrary justice and arbitrary decision making.87 And this decision making
is none other than prosecutorial discretion, itself.
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b. The Origins of Prosecutorial Discretion and its Modern Effects
The American prosecutor is an active member of the “decentralized” and “fragmented”
criminal justice system, according to Ma, and is entitled to “overly broad and largely
uncontrolled discretion[ary]”88 powers. These powers “determine the fate of a majority of
criminal defendants” and yet, these powers are not subject to judicial review.89 But where does
this power originate from? Rebecca Krauss states that the American separation of powers
doctrine is not an adequate explanation to account for the growth of prosecutorial power.90 But
that does not stop Peter L. Markowitz from claiming that prosecutorial discretion is deeply
interwoven into the United States Constitution, namely Article II. 91 Krauss takes a different
approach to the ever perplexing-question. She claims prosecutorial discretion has emerged from
the common law tradition,92 especially with the nolle prosequi.93 Both sides of the argument are
just as enlightening and there is nothing wrong with the theories working in accordance with one
another.
In terms of the nolle prosequi, according to Krauss, dates back to the sixteenth century
and was a procedural device of the English Attorney General to halt criminal prosecutions.94
However, not just any prosecution was forgone. It only applied to cases that were seen as
frivolous or contravened the crown’s royal interest. 95 Upon issuing a nolle, “the court would
terminate the prosecution without any inquiry.” 96 The executive of the United States as well as
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the entire line of prosecutors absorbed and inherited this power. 97 But in America, the nolle was
exercised differently: it able to terminate prosecutions that prosecutors themselves had originally
initiated.98 The termination of cases caused great concern, especially towards the end of the
eighteenth century. This concern is manifest in the Jonathan Robbins, or Thomas Nash, case:99
[Johnathan Robbins] was arrested in South Carolina and accused of participating in
a mutiny on a British ship, the Hermione. Britain formally requested his extradition
pursuant to the Jay Treaty. Robbins was one of many sailors who had participated
in the Hermione mutiny, and his was not the first case to reach American courts. A
year earlier, three of his fellow Hermione crewmembers had been arrested in
Trenton, New Jersey. In the case of one such crewmember, William Brigstock, the
district attorney had issued a nolle prosequi “in obedience to the special command
of the President of the United States.” President Adams’s interpretation of the Jay
Treaty changed, however, in the year following Brigstock’s arrest. As a result,
Secretary of State Pickering told the federal district judge hearing Robbins’s case
that the “President has . . . authorized me to communicate to you ‘his advice and
request,’ that Thomas Nash may be delivered up,” provided that “such evidence of
his criminality be produced, as by the laws of the United States, or of South
Carolina, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial.” After a
hearing, in which Robbins claimed to be an American citizen and defended his
actions aboard the Hermione, the judge acquiesced to Pickering’s request and
ordered Robbins delivered to the British. British troops brought Robbins to
Jamaica, where they court marshaled and executed him within a week (Krauss, 17;
Ruth, 100, 288-89; United States v. Rob[b]ins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 827-31).
President Adams faced congressional censure and barely escaped impeachment.100 Thankfully, in
the year 1800, John Marshall came to President Adams’ aid as seen in Congressional records:101
It is not the privilege, it is the sad duty of courts to administer criminal judgment.
It is a duty to be performed at the demand of the nation, and with which the nation
has a right to dispense. If judgment of death is to be pronounced, it must be at the
prosecution of the nation, and the nation may at will stop that prosecution. In this
respect the president expresses constitutionally the will of the nation; and may
rightfully, as was done in the case at Trenton, enter a nolle prosequi, or direct that
the criminal be prosecuted no further. This is no interference with judicial
decisions, nor any invasion of the province of a court. It is the exercise of an
indubitable and a constitutional power (10 Annals of Cong. 615; Krauss 18).
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Marshall’s statement not only renders both presidential and prosecutorial use of the nolle as a
fundamental and inseparable feature of the American Republic, but it also renders the nolle as
Constitutionally viable, legitimate and even an “executive prerogative.”102 This is because the
discretion associated with the nolle is clearly traceable throughout English history, English law
and, as stated prior, has been absorbed into the American tradition. Furthermore, he also states
that this executive discretion is immune from judicial review,103 but of course there is always
room for exception. Krauss views the nolle in a more conservative light. She claims that this
definition goes well beyond English precedent since the English Attorney General did not share
this power with any other government official as seen in America.104
Nevertheless, Justice Marshall was the first individual to illuminate, and almost blur, the
seemingly hidden bands that connect “the nolle prosequi and the theory of unreviewable
executive prosecutorial discretion,” together.105 But it is also important to note that even though
the executive’s use of the nolle is excused from judicial review, this should not be the case for
public prosecutors or assistant district attorneys, according to Marshall.106 However, as history
has shown us, his advice was not taken into full consideration. Prosecutors not only have escaped
almost all forms of accountability, but they have also escaped judicial review, all thanks to
judicial precedent as seen in case law.
In Commonwealth v. Wheeler,107 the court established that when entering a nolle prosequi
“it is to be exercised at the discretion of the attorney who prosecutes for the government, and for
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its exercise he alone is responsible.” 108 This case also affirmed that line prosecutors did have the
power to issue the nolle, and moreover, that the nolle was not subject to judicial review, either. 109
Krauss states that the remainder of the American courts adopted this hands-off method in regard
to the exercise of the nolle. Marshall was conscious of this, especially in United States v. Hill.110
Here, he noticed numerous courts passing over certain proceedings of which prosecutors felt
were not worth pursuing or simply just a waste of time. 111 But as stated before, the disposal of
cases “was justified by [the Attorney General’s] executive appointment.” 112 In turn,
prosecutorial discretion continued to expand,113 but this time, it grew under the guise of the
separation of powers doctrine.
Prosecutorial discretion becomes intertwined with the President’s “Take Care Clause” 114
in United States v. Corrie.115 This case established that this clause is the textual source of
executive control over criminal prosecutions. 116 Ponzi v. Fessenden117 held this as well, but this
case was far more influential than Corrie. It reaffirmed the connection between the executive
department and criminal prosecutions, but it did so in the absence of the nolle. Later, this case
became the core of United States v. Cox118 which accounted for the separation of prosecutorial
powers doctrine.119 This doctrine was furthered in Milliken v. Stone which states that “the
prosecutor on behalf of the executive makes criminal law enforcement decisions, which the
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courts are ‘powerless’ to review.” 120 These criminal law enforcement decisions now included the
prosecutor’s power to charge.121
With all of this case law backing the prosecutor, they became more powerful than ever.
All the while the prosecutor was growing as a presidential symbol, the nolle started to slip away
from judicial consciousness, especially during the twentieth century. The judges no longer felt
the need to reference the nolle since it had been so well established. 122 After the nolle finally
disappeared, the term “prosecutorial discretion” first made its appearance in the case Poe v.
Ullman.123 Krauss claims that “by 1975, the phrase [prosecutorial discretion] had appeared in
nearly one hundred federal cases” and has become “entrenched in modern case law.” 124 Not only
this, but it has also become intertwined into the prosecutor’s themselves and has caused them to
be one of the most dominant figures in all of the criminal justice system. 125 This idea is touched
upon in the case Wayte v. United States.126 The Wayte court recognized that prosecutorial
discretion is very ill-suited for judicial review and the courts also lack the competency to
undertake these cases, anyway. For if they did, this would further delay criminal proceedings,
threaten law enforcement as a whole, undermine prosecutorial effectiveness and even reveal
governmental enforcement policy. 127
The Wayte court has also described the prosecutor as “an officer of the state unprejudiced
by any motives of private gain […] and possessed the ability to ensure that “the criminal laws of
the state are honestly and impartially administered.” 128 This appears to be a blind assumption
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made by the courts. Misconduct does and will occur, and this is what causes prosecutorial
discretion to become something rather dangerous.
The danger behind the power of prosecutorial discretion is also seen when looking at the
judge as an agent of interpreting the law. Judges fear reprisal for even considering the possibility
of reviewing prosecutorial discretion. If they did, not only would there be an immense backlash,
but criminals could easily obtain pertinent government information and use it to their
advantage.129 Although this seems like a legitimate concern, it is still unsettling to know that the
American judicial branch is indebted with these anxieties every day. How can this be when the
American Republic calls for and demands accountability at all levels?130
Not only have prosecutors escaped all forms of accountability at this point, but they have
also escaped the repercussions normally associated with any form of misconduct.131 Even though
the American Bar Association has set strict guidelines for prosecutorial conduct, but these
standards are not enforceable by any means. They are merely meant to serve as a self-regulatory
measure for “the sake of justice” 132 but even that is too aspirational claims Davis. The
Department of Justice has also set similar guidelines for their federal prosecutors, but these
standards are not enforced, either.
Similarly, individual states have forgone establishing laws that bind prosecutors to ethical
codes and certain standards.133 This is why Davis believes that justice has, in fact, become quite
arbitrary.134 If every decision made under the broad umbrella of prosecutorial discretion was
“just” or “fair,” then it would never be problematic. 135 But “we have become complacent” and
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“afford[ed] trust without requiring responsibility.” 136 Even in Imbler v. Pachtman, the court ruled
that prosecutors are immune from civil liability in criminal cases, regardless of its outcome, due
to the prosecutor’s innate responsibilities of bringing cases to trial.137 Davis also feels that it is
time for reform.138
Nonetheless, prosecutorial discretion is still vital because prosecutor’s do fall under the
executive authority and in turn, it is their job to enforce the laws to the best of their ability when
the president is not able to do so and because most matters do not involve national security.139 In
United States v. Chemical Foundation the court states that in order for prosecutors, as officials of
the executive branch, to perform their functions properly the courts should not “unduly interfere
with prosecutorial decision making.”140 And it is important to note enforcement of the law is
impossible without discretion. 141 Discretion provides both prosecutors and the executive with
credibility and legitimacy, but only if it is used in the proper manner and context. This is why
Davis states that although prosecutorial discretion may be evil it is still necessary.142 Peter L.
Markowitz identifies some of prosecutorial discretion’s major purposes. The first is that
“prosecutorial discretion can be aimed at achieving justice when the strict application of the law
or full enforcement of the proscribed penalties is disproportionate to the specific circumstances
of the offense committed.”143 This is because “prosecutors nearly universally decline to seek the
full penalties warranted under law.”144 Or, offenses can call for full punishment. But sometimes,
prosecutors are merciful and use their discretion when deciding what to charge a criminal with
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especially if they are older, young or even infirm. 145 Prosecutors are also concerned with larger
societal interests.146
But apart from “justice, mercy, and societal utility, prosecutorial discretion is perhaps
most commonly described as serving a purpose related to the efficient allocation of limited
enforcement resources.”147 Since there are only a limited number of resources, prosecutors
cannot prosecute every single case that makes its way to their desk. This is why they need to
make a choice at which case to pursue and which to forego. Markowitz makes an interesting
point in relation to this: “prosecutors, whether they be administrative or criminal, the theory
goes, are in a better position than Congress and the judiciary to assess how to most efficiently
utilize the available enforcement resources.”148 They know exactly what resources will be
needed based upon the available evidence and they are able to foreshadow the likelihood of
prosecuting a successful case.149
As discovered, prosecutorial discretion serves numerous purposes and even acts as a
humanitarian aid or mechanism under the pretext of certain circumstances. However, this fact
alone should not overshadow the problems surrounding prosecutorial accountability in our
modern, democratic regime. Moreover, since John Marshall deemed prosecutorial discretion as
an “executive prerogative,”150 the executive is escaping accountability, as well. But what exactly
is prerogative and what is its primary function?
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III. Prerogative
The notion of prerogative is almost as old as history, itself. The term is often
interchangeable with the term “discretion,” and it has been exercised by kings and executives,
alike. It has been studied by numerous philosophers such as John Locke, David Hume and Sir
William Blackstone. For Locke, prerogative of the executive should be employed in times of
emergency and must be in accord with the laws of nature and the public good. But his Second
Treatise of Government is quite ambiguous and falls silent upon many critical issues: who is to
be the judge of correct uses of prerogative? How many prerogative powers are there, truly? To
attempt to find answers to these questions, I turn to Bartlett, Gail and Everett who have closely
examined Royal Prerogative throughout history, and all the way up until today. Their insights led
me to examine the American political tradition and just exactly how the Founding Fathers
grappled with prerogative in 1789, and whether or not it is constitutionally viable. However, let
us first begin by discussing and examining the history and the definitions of the term in question.

a. Prerogative: History & Definitions
During the Medieval period, prerogative originated in the wake of absolute rulers. These
rulers were both feudal lord and head of the kingdom, according to Gail and Everett. 151 Their
powers were quite vast and often cited as “an undefined residue of power which he might use for
the public good,”152 and the preservation of the realm. 153 This “undefined residue of power” can
be viewed as the nascent stage of prerogative.
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With the establishment of the common law courts, the king’s power grew immensely.
The king could now punish felons and legally settle land disputes over titles. 154 In turn, this
sparked the dissolution of the feudal system and also allowed the king to possess his very first
“defined” prerogative power: immunity from civil and criminal matters. The king even had
unrestricted powers in regard to the conduct of foreign policy, but he was limited in respect to
raising taxation without Parliamentary consent. 155
Even though the king’s powers were becoming more concrete and defined, he still
retained the various prerogative powers that came before the common law system. Without these
residual powers, the king would not have been able to administer justice through his personal
Council due to the insufficiencies of the early common law courts. Even though this was only
done on a case by case basis, numerous uncertainties still arose in regard to the proper use of
kingly prerogative. Therefore, the Stuart kings decided to take advantage of their undefined and
residual powers. Their seemingly endless abuses of prerogative helped aid the Glorious
Revolution of 1688.156
After the revolution ended, the Declaration of Rights of 1689 was created.157 This
document states certain and “specific uses and abuses of prerogative,” 158 on behalf of King
James II. These acts were deemed illegal, ex post facto. Although this is a slight tangent, it is
worthwhile to note that this declaration influenced the birth of the British Constitutional
Monarchy.159
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Turning back to the discussion, Political and Liberal Philosopher John Locke was a sober
spectator of the events that led to the Glorious Revolution. This is not only made evident in light
of the publication date of his Second Treatise of Government,160 in 1689, but also because of the
underlying message of his treatise—the foundation for civil governments and societies alike. For
Locke, civility no longer stems from an aristocratical or monarchical regime but rather from a
democracy. Therefore, all sovereignty is plucked from the king’s omnipotent grasp and handed
directly to the people, once and for all. This is established in §162 of his treatise:
It is easie to conceive, that in the Infancy of Governments, when Commonwealths
differed little from Families in number of People, they differ'd from them too but
little in number of Laws: And the Governours, being as the Fathers of them,
watching over them for their good, the Government was almost all Prerogative. A
few establish'd Laws served the turn, and the discretion and care of the Ruler
supply'd the rest. But when mistake, or flattery prevailed with weak Princes to make
use of this Power, for private ends of their own, and not for the publick good, the
People were fain by express Laws to get Prerogative determin'd, in those points,
wherein they found disadvantage from it: And thus declared limitations of
Prerogative were by the People found necessary in Cases, which they and their
Ancestors had left, in the utmost latitude, to the Wisdom of those Princes, who
made no other but a right use of it, that is, for the good of their People.161 (John
Locke, Second Treatise of Government, §162)
Locke also states that prerogative was often the largest in the hands of the wisest and best
princes.162 This is because the people acquiesced with the least complaint since the ruler acted in
accordance with the “Letter of the Law.”163 Resultingly, the King’s Prerogative naturally
“inlarged.”164 Although, this was not the case for the Stuart Kings. They exercised their
prerogative in an arbitrary manner that was harmful to their people. 165 Any form of harm greatly
offends Cicero’s famous maxim: Salus Populi Suprema Lex.166 This maxim suggests that the
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highest law is that of which promotes the safety, goodness and welfare of the people and allows
it to prevail. Whoever “sincerely follows it,” according to Locke, “cannot dangerously err.” 167
The same maxim may be applied to civil governments and civil societies as well.
Locke’s definition of prerogative is as follows: “the power to act according to discretion
for the publick good, without the prescription of the Law, and sometimes even against it.” 168 This
prerogative power shall be “imployed for the benefit of the Community and to trust the ends of
Government” because men are rational creatures and enter society for their mutual good. 169 So
long as prerogative is exercised in this manner, it is to be considered “undoubted” and just
“Prerogative.”170
In civil society there are two, unified powers: the Executive and the Federative.171 These
powers derive their force from society. 172 The executive’s main function is none other than the
execution of the laws, while the federative is concerned with management and “the security and
interest of the publick […] that it may receive benefit or damage.” 173 In order to pursue these
tasks, the executive is necessarily equipped with both “Prudence” and “Wisdom.” 174 This is
because “the Executor of the Laws” has the “common Law of Nature,” within “his hands” and he
has “a right to make use of it” when “the municipal law has given no direction.” 175 Although, the
executive has this power until the legislature assembles in order to create and enact new
legislation. However, the “law-making power” is far too slow for requisite dispatch, 176 and
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because “institutional or temporal constraints make it too difficult or impractical for the
legislature to act effectively. 177
Moreover, laws do not always provide for the public good or good of society. For Locke,
this means the executor is therefore left to his own discretion, in order to preserve the lives of his
people.178 Once this happens, the laws naturally give way to the executive power. 179And, since it
is impossible to foresee all “accidents and necessities,” the executive is left with an impressive
“latitude […] to do many things of choice, which the Laws do not prescribe.”180
Locke’s theory of prerogative, and the rest of his Second Treatise, has significantly
impacted the American Founding due to its influence upon the American Founders. Even the
Founders repudiated the idea of a monarchical regime. This is why they were very wary of
establishing “an executive who would possess powers not explicitly granted by law, let alone one
who would be permitted to act against the law.” 181 The whole concept of prerogative tells the tale
as old as time and it “implies a return to […] to a kind of discretionary, and potentially arbitrary,
one person rule antithetical to the impersonal liberal ideal of government under law.” 182 Samuel
Adams absolutely resounded the idea of a regime that still exercised prerogative due to its lack of
a legal foundation. Thomas Paine was also abhorred by the idea for he felt that when it came to
America, “the law is king […] and there ought to be no other.” 183
However, in Democracy in America, Alexis De Tocqueville offers a neutral viewpoint on
executive prerogative. He states that “the practical part of a Government must not be judged by
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the theory of its constitution” and that “the President of the United States is in the possession of
almost royal prerogatives, which he has no opportunity of exercising; and those privileges which
he can at present use are very circumscribed. The laws allow him to possess a degree of
influence which circumstances do not permit him to employ.”184 This definition seems to suggest
that prerogative is extralegal instead of extraconstitutional. He also views prerogative as a
mechanism for the security of the union, but due to the precise boundaries that circumscribe the
discretionary powers, this weakens prerogative entirely. 185
Nevertheless, other philosophers such as David Hume, Sir William Blackstone, and JeanLouis de Lolme were on the same wave length as Locke when it came to the concept of
executive prerogative: it was only meant to be exercised in the wake of legitimate national
emergencies.186 Instead of upholding the legal maxim fiat justitia ruat coelum, or let justice be
done though heaven may fall, they stood by the more pragmatic maxim of inter arma silent
leges. This translates to “the laws are silent in time of war.” 187 This is because if the heavens
were to fall, one would sacrifice the ends to the means and that would be a subordination of the
duties of government, overall.188 Hume also stated that “in every government, necessity, when
real, supersedes all laws, and levels all limitations.” 189 This is because for Hume, a perfect
society that only relies on law is beyond the scope of human nature. The imperfections of
humans, and even the imperfections of the law, necessarily calls for the executive to exercise
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discretionary judgment. 190 All of their theories allow for an optimal amount of flexibility when
dealing with unforeseeable circumstances. 191
Moreover, if prerogative is used in the right manner and context, Harvey Mansfield sees
this as entirely unproblematic. After all, he states that the executive power is the sole remediator
for the inconsistencies of human reason, 192 and prerogative my very well be a perfect instrument
in times of great crises. These instances of crises not only call for the exercise of prerogative
power, but they also call for a strong executive, as well. This is how the executive can be both
the defender of the laws and his people while simultaneously exercising a necessary feature of
his character.
Blackstone also mimics these latter arguments and was as Lockean as one could possibly
be when it came to the concept of prerogative. He claimed that prerogative was “the
discretionary power of acting for the public good, where the positive laws are silent.” 193 These
ideas are more or less found directly in Locke’s Second Treatise, as stated. However, “Lockean
prerogative works towards many of the same ends as the rule of law, but through radically
different means:” the Laws of Nature and self-preservation.194 Even though prerogative may act
against the established law, if exercised properly, it should never stray from the precepts of
morality that are closely tied to the natural law tradition. 195
Although in light of this new information and insight, many questions still remain. Is
there more than one prerogative power(s)? Is the executive of the state the only individual who is
able to exercise prerogative? And how exactly can prerogative be accurately employed in times
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of emergencies or special circumstances? In order to answer these questions, it is most beneficial
to regard specific prerogative powers so that we can develop an even better understanding of
prerogative and all of its intricacies.

b. Specific Prerogative Powers
According to Bartlett, Gail and Everett’s article, Great Britain’s Public Administration
committee has categorized the Royal Prerogative powers into three parts: the sovereign’s
constitutional powers, the legal prerogatives of the Crown, and Prerogative executive powers.
The sovereign’s constitutional powers are the discretionary powers of which remain in the hands
of the sovereign such as “the right to advise, encourage, warn Ministers, to appoint the Prime
Minister” and “to assent to legislation.” 196 The legal prerogatives of the Crown assert that the
“Crown can do no wrong” nor is Crown bound to statutes either by word or implication. And
lastly, the executive’s Prerogative powers are the residual and historical powers thus left to the
sovereign, however, these powers are now exercised by Government ministers thus acting in the
sovereign’s name. Various powers include creating and ratifying treatises, conducting
diplomacy, governing overseas territory, and the deployment of the armed forces. 197
Not only has the Royal Prerogative been classified in this way, but Constitutional
Lawyers Bradley, Ewing and Knight have further identified general prerogative powers, as
well.198 The powers are as follows: powers relating to the legislature, the judicial system, foreign
affairs, the armed forces, powers of appointment and honours, immunities and privileges,
prerogative in emergency times as well as miscellaneous prerogative powers. 199
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The powers relating to the legislature include summoning and proroguing of parliament
and even the granting of royal assent to bills, to name a few. In terms of the English judiciary,
these prerogative powers, including pardoning offenders and reducing sentences, are carried out
by the Attorney General. The foreign affairs prerogatives include the creation of treatises, the
declaration of war and keeping the peace. 200 Moreover, the powers of the armed forces declare
the sovereign as the commander in chief under the Crown’s authority. Appointments and
honours include appointing ministers, judges, holders of public offices among others. The
immunities and privileges are solely for the Crown, these are the Crown’s legal prerogatives as
mentioned at the beginning of this section. The emergency powers are restricted to times of war
and the miscellaneous powers pertain to royal charters, mining precious metals, and guardianship
of infants.201 Many of these general prerogatives run parallel to the American political tradition,
namely the functions of the executive as seen in the Constitution, and even the specific
prerogative powers thus mentioned in John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government.
Locke’s first explicit mention of prerogative power, in terms of the Executive, is the
Executive’s ability to “Convok[e] and dissolve[e] the Conventions of the Legislative.”202 This
power, according to Locke, also applies to the Prince. 203 Furthermore, since the goal of civil
society is for the preservation of all, it is only fitting that the next prerogative power involves the
pardoning of offenders for “even the guilty are to be spared” and the executive necessarily must
“mitigate the severity of the Law” upon occasion.204 However, these are the only two specific
powers that Locke mentions. Nonetheless, Locke does put much emphasis on the flexibility of
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prerogative, as we have already discovered. This is because Locke sees undefined prerogative
powers as more beneficial in terms of prolonging the preservation and well-being of society. If
all powers were explicitly defined, then the executive’s functions would be severely limited.
Strict boundaries upon prerogative in times of emergencies or national peril would be extremely
dangerous, just as Hume suggests. Therefore, the impressive latitude the executive possesses to
do things of which the law does not prescribe is the ultimate safeguard for society as a whole.
However, this is where America’s Founding Fathers find themselves at a crossroads with
Locke. Is prerogative meant to be an intrinsic part of the America regime? Alexander Hamilton
and Thomas Jefferson say it is so, but they do not see eye to eye with the exact details of when,
where and why.

c. Prerogative’s Influence Upon the American Founding: Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian
Perspectives
There has been much ambivalence about prerogative and whether it fits into the
Constitutional framework of the American Republic. Even though there are extensive legal and
institutional mechanisms that limit the expansion or creation of powers that go beyond the scope
of normal everyday circumstances, there have been a number of occasions where the executive
has carried out extraordinary acts. 205 Such acts include President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas
corpus, the Bush administration’s “Clean Air Act,” and most recently, President Obama’s
DACA decision. However, these extraordinary measures will be explored in greater detail in
section IV, The Executive.
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Moreover, the courts are even reluctant to issue any verdict as to whether or not
prerogative is constitutional or whether the president is even authorized to take these
measures.206 This is because the constitution is not only silent when it regarding the role of
prerogative, but prerogative, as we know, is also incompatible with judicial review, in the first
place.207 Although, this is due in part, thanks to the American Founders. In particular, Alexander
Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson are two Founding Fathers that speak extensively about
prerogative and its function in relation to the American Republic. Although they have their
differences, they nonetheless agree that “the president may legitimately exercise prerogative
powers in genuine cases of emergency that threaten vital substantive ends, including, primarily,
the preservation of society.”208 This echoes the Lockean tradition and theory of prerogative and
also illuminates the seemingly hidden residual prerogative powers of the English tradition that
have made their way across the Atlantic, as well.
Hamilton views the powers of prerogative to be innately intertwined in the executive’s
vesting clause of Article II of the U.S. Constitution. 209 This was abhorrent in the eyes of
Jefferson, the strict constructionist. He contested “that the national government including the
executive, possesses only those powers ‘specifically enumerated’ in the Constitution,” and
anything beyond the parchment’s scope “would be nothing short of an awful ‘prostitution of our
laws, which constitute the pillars of our whole system of jurisprudence.’” 210 According to
Fatovic, the Hamiltonian executive would invoke powers that are implicit in the Constitution as
justification for performing an extraconstitutional exercise of prerogative while the Jeffersonian
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executive would openly admit to violating the laws and publicly seek post hoc approval.211 Even
though these are two polarized views of a characteristic executive, they both agree that
prerogative is an extraconstitutional power.212 However, an executive prerogative that suspends
or goes against the law seems incompatible with the formal principles of liberal
constitutionalism. This is because the regime often views the law as its primary end and it is even
the basis of order.
Locke would disagree since there is far too much emphasis on the law in this hypothetical
scenario and he claims at the end of the day, the law is an instrument and prerogative can help
achieve and realize more substantive ends.213 If we recall, prerogative is axiomatically
intertwined with promoting and maintaining the public good or the welfare of the people. 214
Even Fatovic reminds us that the public good is the “normative standard built into the very
definition” of the term. 215 Moreover, Locke’s theory also calls for the formal rules to yield, but
only in the presence of fundamental or substantive interests of course. 216
Therefore in the context of substantive ends, prerogative is consistent with liberal
constitutionalism. After all, one of its “chief ‘metaprinciples’ […] is based on the ‘Fundamental
Law of Nature and Government’” insofar as “all Members of the Society are to be preserved.” 217
Despite this normative standard, the Constitution is still a legal document and sets rules
and laws for the nation to abide by. Hamilton and Jefferson abjure the precedents set forth, both
by interpretation and construction, because prerogative, by its very nature, is considered to be sui
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generis.218 And the uniqueness of prerogative and its implementation into practice is what makes
it immune from judicial review or rather, judicial review is an inadequate “check” upon it. 219
However, we cannot avoid the tensions between prerogative and the American Republic forever.
But is it even possible to locate prerogative in the text of the constitution in the first place?
Hamilton claims it is possible, but Jefferson did not agree in the slightest.
Throughout Jefferson’s political life, he had always strictly adhered to the plain text of
the Constitution and rarely, if ever, deviated from its original meaning or context. This is seen in
a personal letter addressed to Samuel Kercheval where he discusses the following precept: “only
lay down true principles and adhere to them inflexibly.”220 It is true, for what good would
transient principles serve as the core of the nation? They would not.
Nevertheless, the United States Constitution does employ true and everlasting principles,
and this is what inclines Jefferson to view the document as a social contract among citizens and
government. Any slight departure from the enumerated powers would undermine the system and
be a usurpation of authority, altogether. Moreover, this authority is derived from the people
themselves. Jefferson felt that it was of the utmost necessity to appeal to the people during times
of great need in order to amend the document rather than perverting what it stands for and
violating the people’s will. Although this would take up much needed time, it would help
improve the constitution in the long run.
However, I cannot help but see certain faults in this line of thought. As history has shown
us, the amendment process is long, and it often leads to Congressional gridlock due to the
polarization of opinion. There is no guarantee an agreement will ever be reached, let alone a
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newly enacted amendment. Since the ratification of the constitution in 1789, there have only
been seventeen new amendments, after the Bill of Rights, over the course of a two hundred and
thirty-year period. That is roughly the equivalent of an amendment every thirteen and a half
years. Not only is Jefferson’s proposal unrealistic but it also undermines the intrinsic energy of
the executive: his secrecy and speed. 221 The second rebuttal that can be made in response to
Jefferson is that the executive would only violate the will of the people insofar as if his actions
are in accord with his private, or personal interests. Acts of this nature would hardly escape
public scrutiny and the president would be held accountable. But this is a rare occurrence
because one of the primary objectives of the president is to represent the will of his people, and
not stray from it.222 And if their will is in accord with some other substantive interest or end
other than what the statutory law prescribes or goes beyond the limited boundaries of the
constitution’s enumerated text, does Jefferson’s argument slip away? I am inclined to say that it
may.
When Jefferson examined prerogative in greater detail he admitted that no nation could
afford to function without it, especially in extraordinary circumstances. 223 He also confesses that
a strict observance of the laws is not the highest duty of them all. Instead, it is prudent to follow
the laws of necessity such as self-preservation in order to save the country from imminent
danger. If we were to lose the country due to “scrupulous adherence to the written law” we
would lose “the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying them.” 224
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The constitution often imitates these higher principles or duties, according to Fatovic, but
due to the limits and defects of the document, it is incapable of providing for all of them.225 If the
constitution were able to provide for these necessities without fail, who is to say we would need
external mechanisms of government at all? Even Publius so eloquently states in Federalist No.
51 that men will never be angels and both internal and external forms of government will always
be necessary. And sometimes, the ambition of the constitution may very well counteract the
ambition of the executive, especially if the people will the executive to do so.226 James Madison
also claims that the struggle for governmental power is not only necessary but essential for the
preservation of liberty. 227
Yet, Jefferson is still is not willing to concede the argument to Hamilton. He strongly
views the use of prerogative in extreme circumstances as both illegal and legitimate for each act
is embedded with a criminal presumption of guilt until the president can prove its merits.228 The
public is meant to be the judge and jury. However, Jefferson further contradicted himself with
the notion of post hoc approval for prerogative. He knowingly went beyond the scope of the
Constitution’s enumerated powers and still bought the Louisiana territory because his
exceptionally high confidence in the people allowed him to presume that they would approve the
act.229 Not to mention, this did not fall under the pretexts of an emergency, either. Although, in
Jefferson’s defense, the purchase of new territory was to prolong “the republican experiment in
self-government.”230 But then again, this was Jefferson’s own ideology and he also expressed his
distaste for those who indulge in their private feelings, when it comes to the exercising and
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evaluating prerogative.231 For Hamilton, this turns Jefferson’s executive into a sort of “lawbreaker,”232 and this is problematic in and of itself. Hamilton has a “more expansive reading” of
the president, one who has “the best intentions for the sake of the nation” and “could always try
to find some justification for his actions in the Constitution, itself.” 233
Hamilton claims that sufficient power is, in fact, necessary and even goes as far to claim
– indispensable – in order to protect liberty to the fullest extent.234 Not only does this power
supply the president with vigor, but also energy. Energy, according to Hamilton is the leading
characteristic of a good government and it is essential for the protection of the community,
property and even the steady administration of the laws.235 Even though energy and prerogative
belong to effective and sovereign governments, “these qualities are most naturally suited to the
executive.”236 And a powerful executive for Hamilton, is “a beacon of salvation in times of
danger,”237 even though emergencies are not as frequent. This is because “the contingencies of
society are not reducible to calculations” for “they cannot be fixed or bounded even in
imagination.”238 This leads Fatovic to argue that it is necessary to leave many things up to the
executive discretion rather than to spell out everything in detail; this would restrain and limit the
government’s ability to protect the supreme value of self-preservation.239
Hamilton also agrees with Jefferson that prerogative is an extraconstitutional instrument
in times of emergencies. He also sees the constitution as a viable document and understands the
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proper relationship between its means and its ends, as does Locke. 240 This is why Hamilton felt
the need to leave the term “executive power,” as seen in Article II of the Constitution as
undefined as possible. If it was explicitly defined, it would further restrict the executive branch
the ability to carry out necessary functions, especially in times of emergencies. 241 Hamilton even
goes as far to say that the constitution contains very few restrictions that would hinder the
government’s ability to deal with emergencies, anyway. 242 Moreover, “emergencies compel the
government to resort to measures that have not been constitutionally specified in advance” 243 and
as Hamilton once stated: “extraordinary exigencies demand extraordinary means.” 244 These
extraordinary means need to be without limitation, as well. James Madison also shared
Hamilton’s view because “political circumstances do not always conform to the constitution”
and this much rather calls for the constitution to conform to the political environment, instead. 245
History has also shown us that there can be no precise bounds in response to exigencies
which requires a power of equal vigor and strength which must necessarily reside in the
executive.246 As long as the extraordinary act or measure does not violate the rights of
individuals, state rights, and is considered moral, “there is a strong presumption in favor of its
constitutionality.”247 Therefore, when analyzing whether or not an act of prerogative is
constitutional, we can not only use Locke’s “normative standard,” as identified by Fatovic, but
we can use this additional standard thus established by Hamilton.
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Although Hamilton and the rest of the Federalist never explicitly mention the term
prerogative, the papers still establish clues and ambiguities that point us to believe that not all
powers are necessarily enumerated as they were originally intended. Even Fatovic explains that
Hamilton was extremely cautious about strictly defining constitutional terms at the convention.
He warned other delegates to be careful as well, he knew that “something would always be
wanting”248 because, in the instance of necessity, undefined powers become “discretionary
powers, limited only by the object for which they were given.” 249 He also responds to Jefferson’s
post hoc approval proposition by stating that would diminish the president’s dignity and also
potentially demerit the nation, as a whole. 250
After examining both perspectives, Fatovic argues that Hamilton and Jefferson also agree
that prerogative is the most preferred mechanism for dealing with emergencies as opposed to
regular institutional methods. Prerogative is even less dangerous than trying to constrain or
expand presidential powers, first and foremost.
For a moment, let us turn back to the discussion on prerogative’s incompatibility with
judicial review. The reason behind this is because the founders wanted to avoid the
“juridification of prerogative […] to avoid setting formal precedents that would hamstring the
ability of the presidents to respond effectively to genuine emergencies in the future or enlarge
their discretionary powers in ordinary circumstances.”251 The founders certainly had the foresight
to make sure that prerogative did not become entrenched into our regime throughout the course
of history. Their reasoning behind preventing the juridification was also accurate because as we
have come to see, prosecutorial discretion has not only emerged from state and federal case law,
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but it has become so intertwined into our Republic to the point where it can never be detached. It
has caused prosecutors to escape accountability and even the president, as we will discover in the
next section.
If prerogative can only be used in cases of extreme emergencies, in what manner or under
which circumstances can executive prosecutorial discretion be invoked? Prosecutors use it every
day to make ordinary decisions, it seems as if it is only a matter of time before the executive does
as well. But we know one thing for sure, prerogative is simply “irreducible to law” 252 and
irreducible it shall remain, in the American Republic that is. This is entirely different than in the
English system since The Royal Prerogative is regularly reviewed by the courts:
In October 2009 the Government published the review of prerogative powers first
promised in the Governance of Britain Green Paper in July 2007. The paper
discussed definitions of the prerogative and the uncertainty over its extent. The
Review went on to state that there are a number of ways in which the exercise of
prerogative powers can be controlled and examined by Parliament, including
through legislation, accountability to Parliament and Parliamentary approval of
expenditure (Bartlett, Gail & Everett, 18).
If we are to learn anything from Royal Prerogative, it would be this: if there came a time in
American history where the executive’s use of his prerogative or discretionary powers is so
controversial that even the public sentiment is divided, and all other democratic mechanisms fail,
then it would necessarily fall upon the courts to render the final verdict even if prerogative is
irreducible to law, as previously suggested. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that this hypothetical
scenario would ever come to fruition. Instead of looking at hypotheticals, it is now time to reflect
upon and examine actual instances and cases where the executive has exercised prerogative or
other discretionary powers.
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IV. The Executive
In the modern era, executive power has become a sort of necessity, according to Harvey
Mansfield.253 Every state needs a strong executive or else it becomes a “courting disaster” and it
is “regarded with pity and contempt by those more fortunate.” 254
As we have come to know, the President is granted numerous powers. Mansfield cites a
few of these powers like the ability to veto the legislature and even the president’s capacity as
the commander-in-chief.255 He is also “quicker and more masterful,” when it comes to “decisionmaking”256 and this is why he is left with “personal power.”257 The president “must acquire and
use personal power in order to secure the formal power promised, but not guaranteed, by the
‘literary theory,’ the constitutional forms, and the developed expectations of the office.” 258 This
is because the Constitution, itself, grants the executive to be strong and allows him to “sit where
he sits.”259 This personal power is also prerogative power as we have already established.
Therefore, it seems repetitive to recount the origins of the executive and his power.
Instead, the overall focus of this section is looking at various acts of executive prerogative or the
executive’s use of prosecutorial discretion. Under each administration that engages in these silent
discretionary powers, every exercise is just as sui generis, or unique, as Fatovic claims. 260 The
most recent use of prosecutorial discretion was issued by President Barrack Obama and his
DACA decision.
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Another major theme in this section will be Markowitz’s account of prosecutorial
discretion appearing in the United States Constitution. This suggests that prosecutorial discretion
is more so rooted in the separation of powers doctrine instead of case law, as suggested by
Krauss in earlier sections. Nonetheless, both theories help illuminate the ambiguities of executive
prerogative in their very own way and both theories can be argued for, coextensively.
However, my ultimate goal for this section is to reach a verdict in regard to the
constitutionality of the DACA decision and whether or not its underlying message runs parallel
to Locke’s theories on executive prerogative. And if it just so happens to pass the Lockean test of
morality as seen under the natural law and the basic principle of self-preservation, it is all the
more important to show why the repeated use of prosecutorial discretion by the executive will
not necessarily lead to more usurpations of power. Nor will it result in tyranny.

a. Executive Prosecutorial Discretion and the Constitution
Even though there “was no direct conversation about the general power of prosecutorial
discretion in the record of the framing of the Constitution,” Markowitz claims, “prosecutorial
discretion was” and still is “an uncontroversial power of the President from the start.” 261 For
example, President Washington initiated, directed and even halted both criminal and civil
procedures.262 These acts were uncontested by Congress as well as the Supreme Court. This is
because, as we recall, prosecutorial discretion was an indubitable feature of the American
executive and it allowed the President to determine “the will of the nation.” 263
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Along with Washington and Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Lincoln and Johnson have also
exercised their broad prosecutorial powers to grant amnesty and to restore civil order in “the best
interests of the nation.”264 However, Markowitz states that the framers did intend “to deprive the
President of the arguably related dispensing and suspending powers” thus exercised and enjoyed
by the English Kings before the Glorious Revolution.265
It has been well documented that the delegates of the Constitutional Convention rejected
the notion of supplying the president with these powers anyway.266 But we have to remember
that the suspension and dispensing of the laws is entirely different than the precepts of
prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutorial discretion is merely temporal and more backwardlooking, according to Markowitz,267 and pardoning dispenses penalties, but not the legal
obligation behind them. On the other hand, a King is able to dispense the penalties, as well as the
concrete legal precedents and the obligations that follow.268 The latter is certainly more arbitrary
and problematic, even though the king’s prerogative powers were meant to be more limited; they
could only be invoked when there was an offense or violation against the state. 269 The events that
unfolded before the Glorious Revolution have proven otherwise.
Moreover, Markowitz claims that it is quite difficult to gauge whether the Framers
intended on limiting executive prosecutorial power since it is never explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution,270 anyway. But as we learned from John Marshall, the essence of prosecutorial
discretion is still embodied within its parchment because “the Framers were brilliant politicians”
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but even more “cautious draftsmen.” 271 And Hamilton made it very clear that the executive
vesting clause was partially undefined and ambiguous for a reason. That reason is none other
than to provide the president with ample flexibility during times of great danger or in the wake of
national emergencies.
Despite the ambiguous nature of the presidential powers, Markowitz still has managed to
expertly trace the essence of prosecutorial discretion in the framework of the Constitution—even
though no single provision can be identified as its sole source. 272 The three main sources are
Article II’s Take Care Clause, the Executive Vesting Clause, and the Pardon Power.273
The basic premise of the Take Care Clause is for the executive to enforce the law to the
best of his ability. The Supreme Court went as far as citing this clause as the main source of
prosecutorial discretionary power as seen in Heckler v. Chaney.274 Markowitz is very wary about
this overly broad grant of power and suggests that there needs to be a limiting principle
associated with it so that the functions of the legislature are not usurped due to enforcement
discretion.275
The discretionary authority granted by the Executive Vesting Clause has been debated for
centuries. Interestingly enough, Justice Scalia was perfectly in tune with the Founders when he
issued his dissenting opinion in response to Morrison v. Olson.276 He stated that he agreed with
the majority opinion when they wrote that “prosecutorial discretion authority falls squarely
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within the executive power,”277 and prosecutorial discretion is a core component of the clause
because it can be used to balance “innumerable legal and practical considerations.”278
In regard to the pardon clause, a pardon is a much greater power compared to an act of
prosecutorial discretion, even though prosecutorial discretion has been absorbed or rather
attached to the pardon power, itself. 279 Since the pardon power is associated with prosecutorial
discretion, the presidential power naturally broadens all the more. Even in the early days of the
Union, the power to grant categorical amnesties from prosecution was part of the public’s
interest and for it helped maintain civil tranquility and prevent rebellion. 280 Additionally, there is
no terminology in the pardon clause that would serve to limit its context to only apply to criminal
matters. Therefore, this ambiguity allows the pardon clause power to extend to any offense
against the United States and it even serves as a “fail-safe protection against unjust deprivation
of liberty,”281 according to Markowitz.
Moreover, in United States v. Wilson, the court held that “the scope of the pardon power
was coextensive with the scope of the king’s prerogative at the time of the framing.” 282 This
jurisprudence suggests that the pardon power may extend into the modern administration as well,
especially where liberty interests lie. 283 This idea is manifest within Judge Cavanagh’s decision
for In Re Aiken County when he was at the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals: 284
The Executive’s broad prosecutorial discretion and pardon powers illustrate a key
point of the Constitution’s separation of powers. One of the greatest unilateral
powers a President possesses under the Constitution, at least in the domestic sphere,
is the power to protect individual liberty by essentially under-enforcing federal
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statutes regulating private behavior . . . . [T]he President’s prosecutorial discretion
and pardon powers operate as an independent protection for individual citizens
against the enforcement of oppressive laws that Congress may have passed (In Re
Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 264 (D.C. Cir. 2013), Cavanagh; Markowitz, 530).
And the protection of individual liberty is the very heart of the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution, anyway. But, Markowitz knows, all too well, that a robust view of prosecutorial
discretion across all administrative contexts allows for more instances of executive inaction and
this would be detrimental to liberty in the long run. 285
In closing, these three clauses hint at the president’s duties but also give way to the
tensions286 and uncertainties that arise with his power--despite the extensive case law that allows
executive prosecutorial discretion to thrive. Nevertheless, there are still many that oppose the
very notion of a discretionary executive, especially today. But this will be discussed in greater
detail in the following sections. It is now time to examine specific exercises of prosecutorial
discretion.

b. Executive Prosecutorial Discretion in Action
Markowitz claims that the executive’s use of prosecutorial discretion becomes
controversial when he enforces categorical or rule-based policies.287 This is because these
policies tend to be driven by independent and normative judgments instead of justice, mercy or
efficiency considerations for the government as a whole. 288 One example of a categorical policy
is when President Carter pardoned half a million men who violated draft laws in order to avoid
military service in Vietnam. The main reason behind this use of the pardon power was to “heal
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the war’s psychic wounds.”289 President Truman and Ford acted in a similar vein for they granted
clemency to thousands of individuals after World War II and Vietnam, as well. 290
President Clinton enacted a “Corporate Leniency Policy” under the Department of Justice
to grant corporations immunity from criminal prosecution, as long as the corporation is the first
one to come forward and report illegal antitrust activity and agree to take a remedial course of
action.291 The Department of Justice has specifically stated that “the grant of amnesty is certain
and is not subject to the exercise of [individualized] prosecutorial discretion.” 292
Markowitz also claims that the Supreme Court is very clear about the constitutionality
when presidents use their absolute discretion whether to prosecute a criminal case or whether or
not to grant broad categorical amnesties.293 Or in other words, the Supreme Court does not
involve themselves with reviewing acts of prosecutorial discretion. 294 Therefore, no matter when
the executive uses prosecutorial discretion, the constitutionality is presumed, until proven
otherwise. Heckler v. Chaney295 hints at this presumed constitutionality, as seen above. In this
case, the Court drew the connections between an “agency’s refusal to institute proceedings” and
“the decision of the prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict” which, in turn, has been
considered as a “special province of the Executive Branch.” 296
As of recently, executive discretion has taken on a new form. Instead of executing,
forgoing or enforcing the laws, there has been a major surge in rulemaking or nonenforcement
policies.297 President Bush was the first to use categorical nonenforcement after his provision for
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the Clean Air Act was struck down by the D.C. Circuit Court. 298 Therefore, he bypassed the
courts and Congress and went straight to the EPA, or the Environmental Protection Agency and
issued an enforcement policy that entailed the agency officials not to initiate enforcement action
against the power plants that would have been protected under the original provision. 299 This
nonenforcement policy created numerous economic conflicts and was harmful to not only society
but directly countered the public interest. Therefore, it is hard to see the justification for this use
of executive discretion. 300 Unfortunately, this pattern of nonenforcement also appeared in the
Food and Drug Administration the Department of Labor, and even in regard to civil or voting
rights,301 even though there were no explicit or specific policies to cite as evidence under the
Bush Administration.302
President Obama also used nonenforcement policies during his time in office. Although,
he did ensure public awareness before instituting these policies—unlike the Bush
Administration.303 The Affordable Care Act is one policy I am referring to. Here, President
Obama stated that he, nor any enforcement agency, will initiate action in response to certain
provisions under that act during the transitional period because it would not be in the public’s
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best interest.304 Markowitz states that this is a more difficult case to interpret but eventually he
ruled that the ACA exceeded the bounds of prosecutorial discretion. 305 One, because the statue
was too ambiguous and did not give a concrete timeline for its implementation. And second, the
statutory scheme appears to be motivated by his political desires and agenda, rather than a desire
held by the people.306 And not only is the will of the nation meant to be regarded with the utmost
importance, but it is also a prerequisite for exercising executive discretion, forthrightly. But this
was not the only nonenforcement policy he enacted during his terms as President. The other is
known as DACA.

i. The DREAM Act & DACA
In June of 2012, President Barrack Obama addressed the nation about immigration
reform and his newly envisioned DREAM Act. The dreamers, he claimed:
[Are] young people and are Americans in their heart, in their minds, in every
single way but one: on paper. They were brought to this country by their parents
-- sometimes even as infants -- and often have no idea that they’re undocumented
until they apply for a job or a driver’s license, or a college scholarship. Put
yourself in their shoes. Imagine you’ve done everything right your entire life -studied hard, worked hard, maybe even graduated at the top of your class -- only
to suddenly face the threat of deportation to a country that you know nothing
about, with a language that you may not even speak. That’s what gave rise to the
DREAM Act. It says that if your parents brought you here as a child, if you’ve
been here for five years, and you’re willing to go to college or serve in our
military, you can one day earn your citizenship. And I have said time and time
and time again to Congress that, send me the DREAM Act, put it on my desk, and
I will sign it right away (President Obama, “Remarks by the President on
Immigration,” 2012).
However, Congress at the time did not see eye to eye with the President. Therefore, after
weeks of Congressional inaction, President Obama decided to transform “prosecutorial
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discretion policy” by “forestall[ing] the deportations of millions of undocumented
immigrants.”307 His policy also transformed from the title of the DREAM Act to DACA or the
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals. This is another nonenforcement policy, just like the
ACA, and it is even more difficult to interpret and unpack:
In the absence of any immigration action from Congress to fix our broken
immigration system, what we’ve tried to do is focus our immigration enforcement
resources in the right places […] we focused and used discretion about whom to
prosecute, focusing on criminals who endanger our communities rather than
students who are earning their education [...] we've improved on that discretion
carefully and thoughtfully. Well, today, we're improving it again. Effective
immediately, the Department of Homeland Security is taking steps to lift the
shadow of deportation from these young people (President Obama, “Remarks by
the President on Immigration,” 2012).
Not only is President Obama enforcing the Department of Homeland Security to follow a
nonenforcement policy, but he when he uses the term “discretion” he is referring to
prosecutorial discretion. The DACA program is dictated as follows:
[DACA applies to] any person who (1) came to the United States before the age of
sixteen, (2) had been present in the United States for at least five years on the date
of the announcement, (3) was engaged in or had completed certain educational
programs or military service, and (4) was under the age of thirty could be
“considered for an exercise of prosecutorial discretion” if that person had not
committed certain criminal offenses. The memorandum announcing the program
stated that decisions about prosecutorial discretion under the DACA program are
to be made on a “case-by-case basis” and that the memorandum does not ensure
that all persons meeting the prima facie eligibility criteria will be granted
prosecutorial discretion. When discretion was exercised under the program,
however, the memorandum made clear that individuals would be granted “deferred
action status” and that they could apply for work authorization (Markowitz, 509).
Deferred action is an act of prosecutorial discretion and has been recognized by the Supreme
Court and Congress in regard to immigration statutes.308
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Nevertheless, it does not matter if DACA is an improvement, or rather, expansion of
executive discretion, there are still many opponents that argue against it; for these individuals
have claimed that the president attempted to dispense the nation’s deportation laws.309 When
regarding this policy upon its face, the president appears to be acting in a manner that runs
parallel to the King of England. As mentioned earlier, a King dispenses both the penalties as well
as suspends the concrete legal precedents and the obligations that follow. 310 He also undermined
the will of Congress by foregoing the typical legislative process and seemingly violated the
separation of powers doctrine enshrined in the Constitution, itself,311 even though the motives
behind the policy were deemed to be in accordance with the public’s interest.
Moreover, Markowitz reminds us that President Obama took it upon himself to reach this
normative judgment through the use of prosecutorial discretion. The core principles of
prosecutorial discretion as we know include justice, mercy and societal unity. If the executive’s
use of prosecutorial discretion were to be limited, this “would be at odds with historic and
modern practice and would significantly undermine the institutional design goals of
transparency, uniformity and accountability.”312 This is why Markowitz proposes that the power
of prosecutorial discretion should be “dependent upon the context of enforcement and that the
power is at its zenith when a president exercises her discretion to protect physical liberty.” 313
And when discretion is used to prevent liberty deprivations, it can serve as a check upon overly
robust or punitive statutory schemes. 314
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It also makes sense for the executive to use prosecutorial discretion in the immigration
context because the limits on immigration authority have never been constitutionally articulated
before.315 And, when DACA was instituted, there were over thirteen million who were
potentially subject to deportation proceedings 316 and it was necessary to distinguish between the
criminals from the innocent victims of circumstance. Immigration operations, alone, cost the
government almost twenty billion dollars annually. 317 It is impossible to prosecute thirteen
million individuals, let alone deport or even detain them. There are simply not enough funds or
resources available to execute that vast number of proceedings, anyway. Moreover, the
Department of Homeland Security is only capable of deporting, at a maximum, one hundred
thousand people per-year.318
Since there is such a large number of potential deportation victims, does this constitute a
national emergency? President Obama never officially declared immigration reform to be one, so
does this mean that executive prerogative and prosecutorial discretion standards naturally slip
away? I am inclined to say they still apply since immigration is both a societal and governmental
interest.319 But then again, the Founding Fathers were extremely silent in regard to immigration.
Although, it was simply not a major theme during the Constitutional Convention. After all, the
Founders did leave the document with a sort of “open texture” thus plagued with imperfections
in order to be amended or considered in greater detail in the later generations. What better time
to consider these societal interests other than right here and right now?
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The very act of deportation is the gravest form of a liberty deprivation of them all.320 For
the Supreme Court has held that deportation is akin to the “loss of all that makes life worth
living.”321 Because of the millions involved in possible deportations, the very potential is what
triggers a heightened sense of executive prosecutorial discretion. 322 Therefore, Markowitz claims
that President Obama fell within the precise and defined limits of his discretionary powers. 323
This is because “if the primary interest belongs to the government, on behalf of the people, the
government should be free to forego enforcement to vindicate that interest at its discretion.” 324
Additionally, the affirmative grant of the work authorization attached to the DACA
memorandum did, in fact, flow directly from a preexisting Congressional statute and not from
executive discretion. 325 Therefore, President Obama never actually bypassed the formal functions
of the Legislature as once proposed. But there is another portion of DACA that still remains in
question. Is DACA retrospective or can be used in the future?326 This question arises because
deferred action is only meant to be temporary,327 but the effects of this program even appear in
the current administration—despite the revisions and rescindments of various parts of the
statutory scheme, today, but that is a discussion for another time. Nonetheless, it is incontestable
that DACA has latched onto the American consciousness, and it does not seem to be letting go
any time soon.
DACA is such a unique use of prosecutorial discretion because Fatovic explains that
prerogative “makes it unnecessary to establish institutional changes” because prerogative “settles
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nothing and prescribes nothing beyond the immediate present.” 328 And there is always an
increased danger if these changes are made permanent or become entrenched into the
constitutional system, much like prosecutorial discretion.329 Moreover, anything temporal may
become permanent if given the time and opportunity. Not to mention, acts of prerogative might
acquire a long-lasting tenor as seen with the formal law. And it appears that DACA has managed
to acquire this tenor, as well. But that is not necessarily a bad thing.
In the end, Markowitz reminds us that the statute does explicitly mention that deferred
action can only be claimed for upwards of a total of three years and even the following DAPA
statute, enacted in the years proceeding DACA, states that it does not protect these individuals
from future prosecution or deportation. 330
Therefore DACA is and was in accordance with President Obama’s executive
authority.331 But most importantly, DACA did not deprive liberty. It much rather expanded it in
an unconventional and quite resourceful manner, if I may. However, what would John Locke
have to say about the viability and constitutionality of DACA?

c. Locke on Immigration, & DACA
Although the United States is heavily focused on immigration reform—either flexible or
inflexible—John Locke is a zealous advocate of open immigration under all circumstances,
especially in regard to moral and economic reasons.332 Locke also views immigration as a “self-
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regulating phenomenon.”333 This is because “Locke believed that refugees and migrants would
only move to a foreign land if they knew they could prosper there.” 334
Moreover, Brian Smith states that a central theme of Locke’s thought is “that no one is
born with political commitments, much less a political subjugation.” 335 What Locke writes about
property owners mirrors this idea:
So that whenever the owner who has given nothing but such tacit consent to the
government will, by donation, sale, or otherwise, quit the said possession, he is at
liberty to go and incorporate himself into any other commonwealth, or to agree with
others to begin a new one, in vacuis locis, in any part of the world they can find
free and unpossessed (Locke, Second Treatise, §121).
Or in other words, individuals are free to move and covenant themselves to whatever body
politic they so choose, or that will rightly have them.336
Interestingly enough, Smith also argues that the government has no claim upon
immigrants who have not expressly consented to a particular country’s authority. Although some
may have tacitly consented, which obliges them to follow those particular laws. 337 Nevertheless,
they are not fully political members until explicit consent is given. 338 But this does not mean that
they are not afforded equal protection for as we know no “state shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws,”339 even if they are not formal citizens. And because of this,
executive discretion is of the utmost necessity when it comes to the statutory scheme of DACA.
Moreover, Locke also states:
But what is to be done in reference to Foreigners, depending much upon their
actions, and the variation of designs and interests, must be left in great
John Locke, “For General Naturalization,” 325.
Smith, 480.
335
Smith, 480.
336
Smith, 480.
337
Smith, 480-81.
338
Smith, 481, 485.
339
United States Constitution, 14th Amendment.
333
334

62
part to the Prudence of those who have this Power committed to them, to be
managed by the best of their Skill, for the advantage of the Commonwealth.”
(Locke, Second Treatise, §147).
Those who qualify for deferred action are students and young individuals who are not criminals
in the slightest. Not only do these individuals and students deserve the flexibility afforded to
them under DACA, but they deserve the opportunity to, one day, become members of not just
the political society, but also the American Republic. If they were deported due to a strict
adherence to the laws, once in a lifetime opportunities would immediately be stripped away from
them for the rest of their lives.
These young minds are an advantage to the “Commonwealth” because “people are the
strength of any government”340 according to Locke. And the very number of people is what truly
makes the country rich, first and foremost. This “richness” can be economic in nature or even be
considered in a culturally or ethnically diverse manner, or anything in between. After all, Locke
does argue that “hands” are the fastest way to grow economic and political progress and
immigration should be encouraged to ensure this growth of a collective and tolerant nation. 341
And this is exactly what America and Americans alike should aspire to create.
President Obama’s statutory scheme, DACA, is truly in accord with Cicero’s maxim Salus
Populi Suprema Lex342 for it allows for the safety, goodness, the welfare and, especially, the
preservation of the people343 that would otherwise be in jeopardy of deportation. Additionally,
President Obama had a right to exercise his discretion in this manner since Locke proclaims that
acts of prerogative are justified when the municipal laws fall silent or give no direction 344—in this
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case, the silence originated in Congress with their failure to create the Dream Act. President Obama
also exercised his prudence and wisdom when formulating the provisions of DACA and even made
sure to narrowly tailor it to the precepts of morality and the greater societal interests, just as
Blackstone and Hamilton once suggested.345 But, if the people are still scrupulous and inquire
about an executive’s use of prerogative now or in the future, “the good or the hurt of the People”
Locke claims, “will easily decide the question,”346 just as it has easily decided the question posed
before us today. But what about a widespread, continuous use of executive prosecutorial discretion
in the future? Is there anything that we should fear?

d. Executive Prosecutorial Discretion and Tyranny?
Tyranny will forever remain as a legitimate fear due to the imperfections and sometimes
unreasonableness347 of the written laws. For if laws were reasonable, they would make all
necessary distinctions among individual cases 348 and then there would never be the issue of the
“penumbra” as often discussed by H.L.A Hart. 349
Moreover, reasonable laws must also be “exact and self-sufficient or perfect.”350
Unfortunately, this will never be the case due to the limitations of human reason and because of
those who are recalcitrant to reason, itself. 351 Therefore, instead of fearing tyranny we must force
ourselves to come to terms with it.352 Although this concept may seem strange, Mansfield brings
up two excellent points in its favor. He claims that Aristotelian philosophy tamed the issue of
tyranny instead of escaping it. Aristotle removed the tyrant and replaced him with the political
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scientist and made him into the guardian of the law instead of its destroyer. 353 Machiavelli did
not escape tyranny either, but instead of taming it, he embraced it and saw tyranny as a wholly
necessary feature of the prince’s character; for the zeal and the vigor of a tyrant is what
ultimately allows for not only initiation but also innovation in any regime.
John Locke and the American Founders adopted the Machiavellian model, but they
democratized it, of course. This was completed by juxtaposing the executive power with that of
the legislative power in order to ensure there are little to no abuses of the executive
prerogative.354
Even though the use of executive prerogative has been increasing in the last few decades,
it is by no means a widespread issue nor is it wholly threatening to the democratic order. This is
because prerogative is immune from judicial review which further protects the republic from
becoming intertwined with prerogative based precedents. And if there is no precedent, then there
is no need to fret. The more important issue at hand is for the executive to be in tune with the
will of the nation and the greater substantive or societal interests that are at large, instead. Not to
mention, the proceeding President is able to veto any previously existing executive action or law
that was created during the prior administration and I am sure the same may be said in terms of
acts of executive discretion.
Nevertheless, if prerogative does become dangerous, Locke suggests that the people
should “appeal to heaven”355 but of course, other constitutional mechanisms will come into play
before that will ever happen, even if the executive and prosecutors both escape accountability at
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more than one level. It is up to the people to stand up and use their voice to protest the abuses or
usurpations of power thus posed upon them.
In the end, prerogative is not tyrannical. Prerogative can become tyrannical in the hands
of a prince who adheres to his self-interest and his self-interest only. But the Glorious Revolution
has long been finished and there have been numerous scholars and philosophers alike that have
all reached the consensus that prerogative is wholly necessary in times of national peril or
emergencies with unforeseen outcomes. It is only wise and prudent for a prince or executive to
be equipped with the laws of nature, as Locke suggests, in order to remedy these ills before they
begin or to halt their devastation immediately in their tracks.
Even though Locke once stated that “wherever law ends, tyranny begins,” 356 prerogative
is not a matter of ending the law for good. It is a matter of discretion to act in such a way that
may or may not run parallel to the written law, itself. Therefore, tyranny will never begin simply
because prerogative happens exists within the very parchment of the American Republic, the
Constitution, and elsewhere.

V. Final Remarks
When “a law sweeps too broadly and bristles with harshness against a significant sector
of the American public, the first and best response is legislative reform,” 357 according to
Markowitz and I agree. However, the American legislative process is often unable or even
unwilling to react to crises for that matter especially as we have seen during the Obama
administration and the immigration arena. Therefore, he had to take matters into his own hands
by using his extraordinary discretionary powers in the wake of a liberty deprivation in order to
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balance the public interest358 and to restore the nation’s will. Moreover, these substantive values
or principles cannot always be remedied by the formal mechanisms of our governmental
institutions. Fatovic even suggests that a viable constitution must simultaneously accomplish two
inconsistent goals: first it must enable statesmen to deal with the ordinary and extraordinary
problems or politics; second, it must prevent those same statesmen from becoming threats to the
liberties and other values they are appointed to preserve.” 359 The second goal requires the
executive to possess discretionary powers and the first goal cannot be “reduced to legalistic rules
or doctrinal formulae” in order to preserve political judgment. 360 There needs to be a “delicate
balance”361 between the two, and prerogative and prosecutorial discretion may just very well be
the solution.
Although it is not wise “to empower the President to substitute [his] own vision of sound
public policy for that of Congress,” for “such a cure would be worse than the disease.”362 But, if
the president is willing to work “alongside the Constitution’s individual rights framework, robust
presidential prosecutorial discretion authority in the liberty deprivation context can provide
another important constitutional tool to protect disfavored groups from unjust applications of the
most coercive power of the federal government.”363 Markowitz suggests that using discretionary
powers in this context is one way to cabin heightened prosecutorial discretion authority used by
the executive branch. It is even consistent with both the historical practice and the very structure
of the Constitution, itself.364 But what can be said in terms of cabining or even doing away with
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prosecutorial discretion in terms of the American prosecutor? Cabining, yes. Doing away with
their discretion overall? No.
Let us take a moment to reflect upon and examine a few examples that epitomize the
problems of law without prosecutorial discretion:
a grandmother in Delaware sent her granddaughter to her third-grade class with a
birthday cake and a knife with which to cut it. The teacher used the knife to cut and
serve the cake, but then called the principal's office to report the girl for bringing a
weapon to school. The school district had a zero-tolerance policy for weapons (to
avoid accusations of discriminatory enforcement) so it had no choice but to expel
the girl for a year. After a public outcry, Delaware legislators passed a law giving
administrators some case-by-case flexibility to modify expulsions from school. The
next year, Delaware first-grader Zachary Christie, excited about joining the Cub
Scouts, brought his camping combination fork, spoon, and knife to use at lunch.
Zachary had violated the school's zero tolerance policy for weapons, so [the school]
suspend him for forty-five days. The board had no choice but to suspend Zachary,
since the new law created flexibility only for expulsions. Because these rigid laws
left too little room for enforcement discretion, they produced absurdly unjust results
(Stephanos Bibas, "The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion," 3).
It is certain that more unjust and absurd results would arise in a system without this vital,
constitutional power. It’s almost analogous to James Madison’s Federalist 10 essay: factions
cannot be eliminated so instead, their effects must be controlled. But how can prosecutorial
discretion be controlled? The answer is simple. The people should demand accountability. Not
necessarily at every stage of the criminal process, but at least portions of it when questionable
issues or motives arise. But of course, this is easier said than done.
Although this may be extreme, Germany requires its prosecutors to prosecute every case
that comes before them as long as they have enough evidence to convict whoever is responsible. 365
On its face, this method seems plausible but at the same time, it also seems as if this overly rigid
system could produce unfair or unjust results, as well.
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But if in the future there is another issue surrounding prosecutorial discretion or even
executive discretion what I can say is this: the American people, including those in government,
should always relate the timeless texts of yesterday to the timely problems that have the potential
to occur, tomorrow. Even H.L.A. Hart once claimed, "jurisprudence trembles so uncertainly on
the margin of many subjects that there will always be a need for someone, in Bentham's phrase,
‘to pluck the mask of mystery’ from its face.”366 The same may be said for discretion, as well; for
my thesis is just one of the numerous attempts to unveil the mystery of prerogative and
prosecutorial discretion. And I am sure I will not be the last.
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VII. Appendix a.
Factsheet G4: The Glorious Revolution

The Declaration of Rights: February 13, 1689

Whereas the late King James the Second, by the assistance of divers evil counsellors, judges, and
ministers employed by him, did endeavour to subvert and extirpate the Protestant religion and
the laws and liberties of the kingdom.

1. By assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and suspending of laws, and the
execution of laws, without the consent of parliament.
2. By committing and prosecuting divers worthy prelates for humbly petitioning to be excused
concurring to the said assumed power.
3. By issuing and causing to be executed a commission under the Great Seal for erecting a court
called the Court of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Causes.
4. By levying money for and to the use of the Crown by pretence of prerogative, for other time
and in other manner than the same was granted by parliament.
5. By raising and keeping a standing army within this kingdom in time of peace without the
consent of parliament and quartering soldiers contrary to the law.
6. By causing several good subjects, being Protestants, to be disarmed at the same time when
papists were both armed and employed contrary to the law.
7. By violating the freedom of election by members to serve in parliament.
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8. By prosecutions in the Court of King's Bench for matters and causes cognizable only in
parliament; and by divers other arbitrary and illegal courses.
9. And whereas of late years, partial, corrupt, and unqualified persons have been returned and
served on juries in trials, and particularly divers jurors in trials for high treason, which were not
freeholders.
10. Excessive bail hath been required of persons committed in criminal cases, to elude the
benefit of laws made for the liberty of the subjects.
11. And excessive fines have been imposed; and illegal and cruel punishments inflicted.
12. And several grants and promises made of fines and forfeitures, before any conviction or
judgment against the persons, upon whom the same were to be levied.

All which are utterly and directly contrary to the known laws and statutes and freedom of this
realm. And whereas the said late King James the Second having abdicated the government and
the throne being thereby vacant, his Highness the Prince of Orange (whom it hath pleased
Almighty God to make the glorious instrument of delivering this kingdom from popery and
arbitrary power) did (by the advice of the lords spiritual and temporal, and divers principal
persons of the Commons) cause letters to be written to the lords spiritual and temporal, being
Protestants; and other letters to the several counties, cities, universities, boroughs, and Cinque
Ports, for the choosing of such persons to represent them, as were of right to be sent to
parliament, to meet and sit at Westminster upon January 22, 1689 . .. And thereupon the said
lords spiritual and temporal and Commons . . . do in the first place (as their ancestors in like case
have usually done) for the vindicating and asserting their ancient rights and liberties, declare:
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1. That the pretended power of suspending of laws, or the execution of laws, by regal authority,
without consent of parliament, is illegal.
2. That the pretended power of dispensing with laws, or the execution of laws, by regal authority,
as it hath been assumed and exercised of late, is illegal.
3. That the commission for erecting the late Courts of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Causes
and courts of like nature are illegal and pernicious.
4. That levying money for or to the use of the Crown, by pretence of prerogative, without grant
of parliament, for longer time, or in other manner than the same is, or shall be granted, is illegal.
5. That it is the right of the subjects to petition the King, and all commitments and prosecutions
for such petitioning are illegal.
6. That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be
with consent of parliament, is against law.
7. That the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their
conditions and as allowed by law.
8. That election of members of parliament ought to be free.
9. That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in parliament ought not to be
impeached or questioned in any court or place out of parliament.
10. That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.
11. That jurors ought to be duly impannelled and returned, and jurors which pass upon men in
trials for high treason ought to be freeholders.
12. That all grants and promises of fines and forfeitures of particular persons before conviction
are illegal and void.
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13. And that for redress of all grievances, and for the amending, strengthening and preserving of
the laws, parliaments ought to be frequently held.

And they do claim, demand, and insist upon all and singular the premises, as their undoubted
rights and liberties; and that no declaration, judgments, doings or proceedings, to the prejudice of
the people in any of the said premises, ought in any wise to be drawn hereafter into consequent
of example. To which demands of their rights they are particularly encouraged by the declaration
of His Highness the Prince of Orange, as being the only means for obtaining a full redress and
remedy therein. Having therefore an entire confidence that his said Highness the prince of
Orange will perfect the deliverance so far advanced by him, and will still preserve them from the
violation of their rights, which they have here asserted, and from all other attempts upon their
religion, rights and liberties. The said Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, assembled
at Westminster do resolve that William and Mary, Prince and Princess of Orange be, and be
declared, King and Queen of England, France, and Ireland, and the dominions thereunto
belonging, to hold the Crown and royal dignity of the said kingdoms and dominions to them the
said Prince and Princess during their lives, and the life of the survivor of them; and that the sole
and full exercise of regal power be only in, and executed by the said Prince of Orange, in the
names of the said Prince and Princess, during their joint lives; and after their deceases, the said
Crown and royal dignity of the said Kingdoms and dominions to be to the heirs of the body of
the said Princess; and for default of such issue to the Princess of Anne of Denmark and the heirs
of her body; and for default of such issue to the heirs of the body of the said Prince of Orange.
And the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and the Commons do pray the said Prince and Princess to
accept the same accordingly.

